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In this note I develop some further thoughts that build on my paper entitled a “A Theory 
of Corporate Venturing.”  In this paper I develop a formal economic model of why 
corporations may face difficulties when making venture capital investments.  In thinking 
broadly about the reasons why corporations may have difficulties when investing in 
entrepreneurial companies, I see three main sets of issues.  The first set of reasons 
revolves around issues of intellectual property rights.  The second set relates to strategic 
conflicts of interest.  The third set concerns issues of organizational design and conflict 
within the corporation.   
 
The theory paper deals directly with the second set of issues, the conflicts of interest that 
result from the strategic objectives of the corporation.  In this note I therefore want to 
focus on the first and third area of problems.  Many would argue that entrepreneurs don’t 
want corporate investors because they do not want their intellectual property stolen.  I 
would actually argue that, while intellectual property is important, these problems should 
not be overstated.   
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Indeed, there are two reasons why the problem of intellectual property is unlikely to be 
severe in many situations.  First, not all entrepreneurial companies are based on 
intellectual property rights.   Often the competitive advantage of entrepreneurial 
companies revolves around their ability to implement a technology, or around the 
capabilities of the entrepreneurs.  In those cases intellectual property is of secondary 
importance.   Second, even when intellectual property rights are an important asset of the 
entrepreneurial company there are reasons to believe that corporate investors should not 
have a significant disadvantage when competing with independent venture capitalists.  
We need to look at the marginal effect of a corporate venture investment.  The 
intellectual property rights of the entrepreneurial companies may not be safe in the first 
place.  The question is thus how the likelihood or the extent of intellectual property theft 
increases as a function of choosing the corporate investor, rather than a venture capitalist.  
One may make the argument that the marginal effect is sometimes negative: the 
corporation may find it more difficult to steal information once it becomes an investor, 
because any legal accusation is more likely to be taken serious. 
 
The intellectual property rights of the entrepreneurial companies are not entirely safe with 
‘independent’ venture capitalists either.  Many venture capitalists have the ability to 
invest in competing companies, and they may even have the ability to set up competing 
companies.  Precisely because venture capitalists have a network of contacts with 
entrepreneurs and other people in the area of technology, they may be well positioned to 
capitalize on a good idea.  On this, venture capitalists would typically argue that they 
wouldn’t do this explicitly, but they admit that they are influenced by all of the 
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information that they receive as part of the investment process.  It is therefore quite 
possible that some ideas that they hear from one corporation eventually get implemented 
with another corporation.   
 
If we accept the argument that intellectual property rights are not always at the core of the 
problems that corporations face when making venture capital investments, we may turn 
to the other two arguments.  In my theory paper I discussed the role of the strategic 
objectives of a corporate investor.  Let me briefly explain the main insight from that 
paper.  A corporation is likely to be a better investor than a venture capitalist if there is a 
fundamental complementarity between the profits and the core business of the 
corporation and the success of the entrepreneurial venture.  If, however, there is 
cannibalization, then entrepreneurs prefer independent venture capitalists.  The notion of 
complements and substitutes will be useful below. 
 
The third set of reasons why corporations seem to have problems relates to the internal 
organization of corporate venturing.  This is often discussed in the language of the 
‘inefficient bureaucratic nature’ of large corporations, although I would argue that there 
are deeper internal conflicts within the corporation.  This is a difficult area to understand 
for economists, given the intricacies of understanding transactions within the firm.  In 
this note I will lay out a simple intuition of what I believe is central to understanding the 
phenomenon, leaving any formal modelling to future research. 
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The way that the problem of corporate venture investing is often depicted in the business 
literature is one of ‘bureaucracy:’ corporations are ‘too formal’ and ‘too slow’ to respond 
to the needs of entrepreneurial companies.  While there may be some truth to this, I 
suspect that this is too simplistic.  In particular, it ignores the economic forces that 
prevent corporations from being efficient venture capital investors.  
 
There may be benefits to organizational inertia that economists have not understood very 
well so far.  Indeed, sociologists probably have a much better understanding of these 
issues.  Their line of reasoning is typically that if organizations were not inert, then they 
would be somehow more exposed to the evolutionary forces and more likely to die.  The 
problem economists may have is that this counter-factual is rarely formally specified.  
The most natural conjecture I can think of is that it is in the interest of the company to 
make commitments, especially commitments to its work force, not to change its strategy 
too frequently.  A commitment to a stable strategy gives employees better incentives to 
invest in human capital. 
 
More generally it seems that a central problem for corporations is that some managers 
may face a decline in the value of their human capital as a result of corporate venture 
investing.  In my theory paper I had a single net benefit function for the corporation’s 
core business.  The above argument suggests that different people in the organization are 
affected differently by the corporate venturing activities.  In particular, it may be that the 
net profits that accrue to shareholders are positive, individual managers may experience a 
net loss of human capital.  This can easily lead to a situation where a certain venture 
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investment is in fact a complement to shareholder value, but a substitute to the managers’ 
human capital.  Or there may be a distribution of human capital changes.  While 
individuals in the corporation at large (including shareholders) may benefit from a 
particular corporate venture investment, there may be one individual department or a 
particular group of people that will be significantly harmed.  We have a situation where 
the benefit accrues to many and the cost to few.  This is a classic setting to expect strong 
resistance activity by a minority coalition.  The minority coalition may have much 
stronger incentive in fighting or derailing the corporate venture investment, and it may be 
able to do so if there is no clear political representation of the majority benefit. 
 
The question then is whether shareholders could write contracts with the managers to 
compensate them for the loss of human capital.   It is hard to imagine how shareholders 
could make contacts on future changes in technology or future changes in manager’s 
human capital.  We are therefore faced with a situation where managers bias their 
decisions to protect their human capital, and the financial incentives of the usual sort are 
insufficient to prevent this self-interested behavior. 
 
The issues discussed here are in fact much broader than the problem of corporate venture 
investing.  The logic I alluded to might be thought of as a building block of a more 
general economic theory of the ‘not-invented-here’ syndrome.  This seems to be a fairly 
pervasive problem across corporations: inventions that are not generated internally are 
less likely to be adopted.  The traditional explanation for this phenomenon relies on 
cognitive biases. 
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So far I have emphasized the existence of conflicts within the corporation that turn 
investments that seem to be complements into effective substitutes.  One question is 
whether the corporation can create organizational designs to minimize conflicts.  I have 
already mentioned that simple financial contracts may fail.  One can think of other 
organizational solutions to address this problem.  In fact we do observe a number of 
different organizational structures that corporations use when engaging in venture capital 
investments.  Within the corporation a key question is how active senior management is 
in the supervision of the corporate venturing efforts.  There is an argument to be made 
that this decision is not sufficiently general for the board of directors to take care of it.  
And while the CEO ought to be involved, he or she probably ought not to be the main 
person in charge of it.  The key question is then which senior vice-president ought to be 
made responsible.  While this answer cannot be answered in general, our discussion 
makes it clear that to supervise the venture investing efforts, it is important to have 
somebody in charge that represents the benefits of the corporation at large.   Moreover, if 
the corporate venturing efforts are left to lower levels of management then the potential 
for internal conflict is likely to grow, as lower level managers are less likely to assess the 
overall interests of the corporation. 
 
If the company wants to ‘outsource’ its venture capital activities, then we have a 
spectrum of alternatives.  The corporation can create a venture capital subsidiary, it can 
engage in joint ventures, or it can give its money to an independent venture capitalist.  
The example of Apple Computer is interesting.  Apple Computer created a subsidiary 
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with considerable independence, but a number of reasons suggest that the experiment was 
not entirely successful.  For example, while the managers of the subsidiary were given 
independent financial incentives - in fact Apple Computer compensated them along the 
lines of an independent venture capitalist – this did not eliminate the career concerns of 
the employees within a corporation.  In order to avoid any of the problems of internal and 
strategic conflict, there is a possibility of leaving all venture capital decisions to an 
external venture capital fund.  But there is a general trade-off here.  The more remote a 
corporation is from its venture investing, the better it is able to solve the problems of 
strategic interference, but by the same token, it is less able to benefit strategically from 
these venture capital investments.  
 
To conclude, in this note I have explored three reasons why corporations seem to have 
difficulty making venture capital investments.   Theft of intellectual property, is a 
concern, although it is probably relatively unimportant in many circumstances.  The 
problem of strategic conflict is important if the entrepreneurial company is a substitute 
for the corporate investor’s core business.  Finally, internal conflicts are probably 
pervasive, but they are still difficult to understand for economists, making them a 
promising area for future research. 
